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1. Introduction 
One central issue concerning philosophical methodology is this: what concepts 
should go into our philosophical toolbox? That is to say, what notions are 
appropriate to rely on in doing philosophy? This issue is relevant not only to 
how we should go about addressing philosophical problems but also how we’re 
to formulate those problems in the first place. There is a burgeoning literature 
on the notion of grounding. I’m a proponent of grounding – I think the notion 
of grounding is coherent and theoretically useful.1 Supposing that the notion of 
grounding belongs in our philosophical toolbox, what consequences might this 
have for familiar philosophical problems? In this chapter I focus on what 
Jackson (1998) calls placement problems – problems concerning how the 
manifest facts (e.g. facts concerning ordinary macroscopic objects, the mental, 
and the moral) “fit into” the world given that the world is ultimately physical in 
nature. If we formulate placement problems in terms of grounding, we should 
expect new possibilities to open up with respect to how to solve them. My goal 
                                                
1 See Audi 2012, Fine 2012, Raven 2012, Rosen 2010, and Schaffer 2009 for defenses 
of the coherence and theoretical utility of the notion. For introductions to the notion 
of grounding and reviews of recent work on the notion, see Bliss and Trogdon 2014, 
Clark and Liggins 2012, Correia and Schnieder 2012, Raven forthcoming, and 
Trogdon 2013a.  
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in this chapter is to show that this is precisely what happens with respect to the 
content placement problem, the problem of how to fit facts concerning mental 
content into the actual world given that it’s ultimately physical in nature. 
2. Placement: modal entailment vs. grounding 
We begin with the notion of a placement problem. A familiar take on what it is 
to address such a problem – what I’ll call the modal view of placement – has 
two components. First, to show how a manifest fact fits into the actual world 
given that it’s ultimately physical in nature is to identify broadly physical facts 
that modally entail the manifest fact, where the modality in question is 
metaphysical in nature. (We could put the claim in terms of supervenience as 
well.) Second, the broadly physical facts include facts concerning the physical-
nomic profiles of physical properties, events, and objects. To specify the 
physical-nomic profile of an entity is to specify facts concerning the nomic 
relations that entity bears to other physical entities as well as facts concerning 
the nomic relations that physical entities bear to it. Call these the metaphysical 
and nomic takes on the fitting-into relation and broadly physical truths, 
respectively. So the modal view of placement gives pride of place to modality 
twice over: the fitting-into relation is understood in purely modal terms, and the 
domain of facts with which we wish to relate the manifest facts include certain 
modal facts. 
Placement problems and the modal view of placement have played an 
important role in philosophy for the past thirty years or so. Think, for example, 
about contemporary metaphysics of mind. One placement problem with respect 
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to the mental that has received an enormous amount of attention is this: given 
that the actual world is ultimately physical in nature, how do the phenomenal 
facts – the facts about which phenomenal properties we instantiate – fit into the 
world? The non-reductive physicalist thinks she has a solution to the 
phenomenal placement problem, and a familiar formulation of her thesis is this: 
while phenomenal and physical properties are distinct, facts concerning the 
physical-nomic profiles of instantiated physical properties modally entail the 
phenomenal facts. 
An alternative to the metaphysical take on the fitting-into relation is the 
following: to show how a manifest fact fits into the actual world given that it’s 
ultimately physical in nature is to identify broadly physical facts that ground the 
manifest fact in question. What reason do we have to take the grounding take 
on the fitting-into relation seriously? Well, it’s natural to think that part of what 
it is for a manifest fact to fit into the world is for there to be an explanation of 
that manifest fact in terms of broadly physical facts. And proponents of 
grounding claim that grounding and explanation are connected in a way that 
modal entailment and explanation aren’t. More specifically, the idea is that 
grounding is either an explanatory relation (Dasgupta 2014, Fine 2012, and 
Litland 2013) or a non-explanatory, explanation-backing relation (Audi 2012 
and Schaffer 2012), while modal entailment is neither sort of relation. 
My interest here, however, isn’t the grounding take on the fitting-into 
relation per se. Instead, I’m interested in the picture of placement that emerges 
if we combine the grounding take on the fitting-into relation with a grounding 
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take on broadly physical facts. The conception of broadly physical facts I have 
in mind is this: the broadly physical facts include not only facts concerning the 
physical-nomic profiles of physical entities but their physical-grounding 
profiles as well. To specify the physical-grounding profile of an entity is to 
specify what physical facts ground the facts about that entity, as well as what 
physical facts are grounded by the facts about that entity. While the modal view 
of placement consists of the metaphysical take on the fitting-into relation and 
the nomic take on broadly physical facts, let the grounding view of placement 
be the conjunction of the grounding takes on these notions set out above. Just as 
modality figures in the modal view of placement twice over, grounding figures 
in the grounding view of placement twice over: the fitting-into relation is 
understood in terms of grounding, and the domain of facts with which we wish 
to relate the manifest facts include certain facts about what grounds what. 
If we formulate placement problems in terms of grounding along the 
lines described above we should expect new possibilities to open up with 
respect to how to solve them. I’m going to argue that this is so with respect to 
the following placement problem in particular: given that the actual world is 
ultimately physical in nature, how do the content facts – the facts about what 
our concepts refer to – fit into the world? 
Our point of departure is the informational approach to the content of 
concepts championed by Fodor (1990), Dretske (1995, Ch. 1), and others. This 
approach is naturally viewed as one way of (partially) answering the content 
placement problem, where either the modal view of placement or a combination 
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of the modal and grounding views – one that embraces the grounding take on 
the fitting-into relation and the nomic take on broadly physical facts – is 
operating in the background. On the former view of placement the 
informational approach has it that certain broadly physical facts – facts 
concerning the physical-nomic profiles of physical entities in particular – 
modally entail the content facts, while on the latter view of placement this 
approach to content has it that these broadly physical facts ground the content 
facts. 
The informational approach to content understood in either way, as well 
as the program of naturalizing content in general, has fallen out of favor. Many 
(most?) philosophers interested in mental representation are skeptical that 
anything like the informational approach is even close to being right. But 
suppose that the grounding view of placement is correct rather than the modal 
view or the combination of these views described above. In this case, a new sort 
of informational approach emerges: certain broadly physical facts concerning 
the physical-nomic and physical-grounding profiles of physical entities ground 
the content facts. What might such an account look like? In this chapter I 
propose a theory of content along these lines, one that’s modeled on Fodor’s 
(1990) asymmetric dependence theory but has important advantages over it. 
The literature on the asymmetric dependence theory of content and naturalistic 
theories of content more generally ran dry a while ago, but with recourse to 
grounding it will be profitable to consider them afresh. 
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3. Fodor’s asymmetric dependence theory 
While you’re probably familiar with Fodor’s theory, it’s important that we get 
the details of the asymmetric dependence theory right since the theory that I go 
on to offer is modeled on his theory. (So be patient!) Let’s focus on the concept 
RABBIT. Fodor argues that informational theories that proceed upon a distinction 
between normal and abnormal circumstances in which RABBIT is activated face 
insurmountable problems, so he proposes an entirely different type of 
informational theory. Consider the set Δ, where Δ consists of all and only the 
nomic relations that have some property or other in their first argument place 
and RABBIT in their second. Although he doesn’t put things in quite this way, as 
I read Fodor his key idea is this: if there is a relation of the appropriate sort that 
induces an ordering with respect to the members of Δ such that rabbit/RABBIT 
(the nomic relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT) occupies a special 
position, it follows that being a rabbit is the content of RABBIT. Call this type of 
informational theory the nomic ordering theory. Fodor urges that we abandon 
informational theories that appeal to a distinction between normal and abnormal 
conditions and focus on developing nomic ordering theories instead. 
Fodor develops a particular nomic ordering theory, the asymmetric 
dependence theory. Any nomic ordering theory has two related parts. 
Continuing with our focus on RABBIT, the first concerns just what the relevant 
ordering is of the members of Δ. Fodor works with the following: there is a 
particular relation, R, such that rabbit/RABBIT bears R to every other member of 
Δ, while none of them bear R to rabbit/RABBIT. The second concerns just what 
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relation induces the relevant ordering. Let’s say that, for any properties P and 
Q, if there is a nomic relation between P and RABBIT and a nomic relation 
between Q and RABBIT, then the former counterfactually determines (c-
determines for short) the latter just in case, ceteris paribus, were P not 
nomically related to RABBIT, Q wouldn’t be either. Fodor works with the idea 
that R is the relation of c-dependence. Putting all of this together, the 
asymmetric dependence theory (with respect to RABBIT) is this: it’s necessary 
that (i) if rabbit/RABBIT c-determines every other member of Δ, and (ii) no 
member of Δ distinct from rabbit/RABBIT c-determines rabbit/RABBIT, then 
being a rabbit is the content of RABBIT. 
A couple of points worth keeping in mind about the asymmetric 
dependence theory are as follows. First, while the theory is referentialist in 
nature (i.e. it identifies the content of a concept with its referent), it’s 
compatible with the denial of Fodor’s radical nativism about concepts. Second, 
the theory aims to provide a sufficient condition for a property to be the content 
of a concept. So to point out that the asymmetric dependence theory apparently 
doesn’t cover empty concepts, logical concepts, concepts whose referents are 
response-dependent properties, and so on isn’t necessarily to undermine the 
theory. Were the aim instead to provide a necessary condition for something to 
be the content of a concept, we would have a problem here. (The same 
considerations apply to the theory of content I set out later.) 
On the modal view of placement the asymmetric dependence theory as 
stated is a candidate solution to the content placement problem, as (i) and (ii) 
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from above are broadly physical propositions. (So we can speak of broadly 
physical propositions in addition to broadly physical facts – for the purposes of 
this chapter I understand facts to be true propositions.) On a view of placement 
that mixes the grounding take on the fitting-into relation and the nomic take on 
broadly physical truths, the following variation of the asymmetric dependence 
theory is a candidate solution to the content placement problem: it’s necessary 
that if (i) and (ii) from above are true, then the truth of (i) and (ii) grounds the 
fact that being a rabbit is the content of RABBIT. (This theory is also a candidate 
solution to the problem given the grounding take of placement as well.) 
Given that there is a nomic relation between being a hare and RABBIT, 
the sufficient condition the asymmetric dependence theory identifies for being a 
rabbit to be the content of RABBIT is satisfied only if rabbit/RABBIT c-determines 
hare/RABBIT and not vice versa. In other words, the following qualified 
counterfactual is true: ceteris paribus, were being a rabbit not nomically related 
to RABBIT, being a hare wouldn’t be either, but not vice versa. Suppose that we 
establish that this qualified counterfactual is true only if a particular non-
qualified counterfactual is true as well. (Candidate example: were it not the case 
that hares cause the activation of RABBIT it still would be the case that rabbits 
cause the activation of RABBIT.) It’s important to note that Fodor doesn’t see his 
job as requiring that he provide arguments for either the qualified or non-
qualified counterfactuals just mentioned, and the same goes for the other 
counterfactual commitments of his theory. What he’s trying to do is address 
“…Brentano’s problem [i.e. the problem of content placement] by showing that 
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there are naturalistically specifiable, and atomistic sufficient conditions for a 
physical state to have an intentional content,” and “In that context, I get to 
stipulate the counterfactuals” (1990, 96).2 
4. The problem of Quinean alternatives 
The problem of Quinean alternatives shows that the sufficient condition 
identified by the asymmetric dependence theory isn’t satisfied, as Fodor himself 
later admits (1994, Ch. 3). Indeed, on the basis of this problem Fodor concludes 
that no purely informational theory can solve the content placement problem. 
What is the problem exactly? While you’re probably familiar with the problem 
at least in broad outline, the details again are important, for the theory that I go 
on to offer doesn’t face this problem, or so I argue. (So again, be patient!) 
Consider the following property: being some non-detached rabbit 
proper part or other (being non-detached for short). Not only is there a nomic 
                                                
2 What sorts of properties distinct from being a rabbit in addition to being a hare are 
nomically related to RABBIT? The following are plausible candidates: other 
properties involved in misperception (e.g. being a possum on a dark night), 
properties involved in non-psychological interventions with respect to RABBIT (e.g. 
being bumped – the property of having your head bumped in thus-and-so way), 
properties associated with causal intermediaries between the activation of RABBIT 
and its distal causes (e.g. properties concerning irradiation patterns on the retina), 
properties in virtue of which the aforementioned properties are instantiated, and 
disjunctive properties whose disjuncts include any of the aforementioned properties. 
Supposing that these properties are nomically related to RABBIT, the sufficient 
condition identified by the asymmetric dependence theory for being a rabbit to be 
the content of RABBIT is satisfied only if certain counterfactuals concerning them are 
true, such as rabbit/RABBIT c-determines bumped/RABBIT. 
  717 
relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT, but there’s a nomic relation 
between being non-detached and RABBIT as well.3 Indeed, it seems that 
rabbit/RABBIT and non-detached/RABBIT are intensionally equivalent in the 
following sense: any possible world in which there is a nomic relation between 
being a rabbit and RABBIT is a world in which there is a nomic relation between 
being non-detached and RABBIT and vice versa. Let’s suppose that they are 
indeed intensionally equivalent in this sense. 
While Fodor doesn’t put things in quite this way, the problem arises 
when we consider the fact that c-determination is intensional in nature. A 
consequence of the intensional nature of the relation is this: for any properties P 
and Q, if (i) there is a nomic relation between P and RABBIT, (ii) there is a 
nomic relation between Q and RABBIT, and (iii) P/RABBIT c-determines 
Q/RABBIT, then (iv) any nomic relation that’s intensionally equivalent with 
                                                
3 You might claim that, while it may be that being non-detached is nomically related to 
certain concepts, it isn’t nomically related to RABBIT. As Gates (1996) points out, 
however, the method of differences – the test Fodor appeals to in arguing that 
certain properties (e.g. being a small rabbit) aren’t nomically related to RABBIT – 
doesn’t suggest that being non-detached isn’t nomically related to RABBIT. Indeed, 
the test suggests that it is. You might also claim that being non-detached isn’t 
nomically related to RABBIT because it doesn’t enter into any nomic relations 
whatsoever. Perhaps the idea is that the property is disjunctive, and disjunctive 
properties don’t enter into nomic relations. Fodor, however, grants that disjunctive 
properties do stand in nomic relations so long as they aren’t open disjunctions. There 
would be no disjunction problem to begin with if disjunctive properties didn’t stand 
in nomic relations! Moreover, it’s unclear that being non-detached is disjunctive in 
the first place – it strikes me as second-order monadic property and as such is 
projectible (see Fodor 1997 for relevant discussion).  
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P/RABBIT c-determines Q/RABBIT, and (v) any nomic relation that’s 
intensionally equivalent with Q/RABBIT is c-determined by P/RABBIT. Given 
(iv), if rabbit/RABBIT c-determines non-detached/RABBIT then non-
detached/RABBIT does as well. And, given (v), if non-detached/RABBIT c-
determines non-detached/RABBIT then it c-determines rabbit/RABBIT as well. 
Hence, if rabbit/RABBIT c-determines non-detached/RABBIT then non-
detached/RABBIT c-determines rabbit/RABBIT. So the very formal features of c-
determination – in particular the fact that it’s intensional in nature – ensure that 
the sufficient condition identified by the asymmetric dependence theory for 
being a rabbit to be the content of RABBIT is never satisfied.4  
                                                
4 See Adams and Aizawa 2010 for related discussion. Notice that we get the same 
result even if we grant that there are possible worlds in which there is a nomic 
relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT but not being non-detached and RABBIT 
and there are possible worlds in which there is a nomic relation between being non-
detached and RABBIT but not being a rabbit and RABBIT. (It’s hard to imagine what 
such worlds are like, but let’s put this matter to the side.) Supposing that there are 
such worlds, they’re radically different from the actual world. As such, they aren’t 
relevant to establishing whether rabbit/RABBIT c-determines non-detached/RABBIT 
and vice versa. So let’s restrict our attention to worlds that are potentially relevant to 
evaluating these claims – call such world rabbit worlds. Rabbit/RABBIT and non-
detached/RABBIT are intensionally equivalent in rabbit worlds – any rabbit world in 
which there is a nomic relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT is a world in 
which there is a nomic relation between being non-detached and RABBIT and vice 
versa. It follows from the intensional nature of c-determination that, for any 
properties P and Q, if (i) there is a nomic relation between P and RABBIT, (ii) there is 
a nomic relation between Q and RABBIT, and (iii) P/RABBIT c-determines Q/RABBIT, 
then (iv) any nomic relation that’s intensionally equivalent with P/ RABBIT in rabbit 
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Adams and Aizawa (2010) catalogue various objections to the 
asymmetric dependence theory, as do Rupert (2008) and Ryder (2009). Many 
objections to the theory proceed upon fairly specific assumptions about how to 
evaluate counterfactuals (e.g. assumptions regarding the relative proximity of 
possible worlds to the actual world). These assumptions are contentious, so I 
don’t put a lot of stock in these sorts of objections, and Fodor probably doesn’t 
either. Notice that the problem of Quinean alternatives, however, doesn’t seem 
to proceed upon any contentious assumptions. 
5. The grounding theory 
Recall that the asymmetric dependence theory, as a nomic ordering theory, has 
two related parts – the first concerns the ordering of the members of Δ, and the 
second concerns the relation that induces this ordering. The problem of Quinean 
alternatives shows that, if the members of Δ are ordered in the way that Fodor 
claims they are, it can’t be the relation of c-determination that induces that 
ordering. R isn’t the relation of c-determination. 
If the asymmetric dependence theory is to be rejected, what might 
another nomic ordering theory look like? Let’s keep the first part of the 
asymmetric dependence theory intact: continuing with our focus on RABBIT, 
we’ll work with the following: rabbit/RABBIT bears R to every other member of 
Δ, while none of them bear R to rabbit/RABBIT. What we’re going to change is 
the second part of theory. The grounding approach to placement suggests that 
                                                                                                                             
worlds c-determines Q/RABBIT, and (v) any nomic relation that’s intensionally 
equivalent with Q/RABBIT in rabbit worlds is c-determined by P/RABBIT. 
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we have another option here: R, rather than the relation of c-determination, is a 
relation defined in terms of grounding. Grounding is a relation between facts 
(true propositions), and nomic relations aren’t facts. So let’s say that, for any 
properties P and Q, P/RABBIT grounds* Q/RABBIT just in case the fact that there 
is a nomic relation between P and RABBIT grounds the fact that there is a nomic 
relation between Q and RABBIT. The idea is that R is grounding*. Putting all of 
this together, the grounding theory (with respect to RABBIT) is this: it’s 
necessary that if (i) rabbit/RABBIT grounds* every other member of Δ, and (ii) 
no other member of Δ grounds* rabbit/RABBIT, then the truth of (i) and (ii) 
grounds the fact that being a rabbit is the content of RABBIT.5 On the grounding 
view of placement, the grounding theory is a candidate solution to the content 
placement problem, as (i) and (ii) from above are broadly physical propositions. 
Before returning to the problem of Quinean alternatives, five points of 
clarification about how I’m conceiving of the grounding theory are as follows. 
First, given that there is a nomic relation between being a hare and RABBIT, the 
sufficient condition identified by the grounding theory for being a rabbit to be 
the content of RABBIT is satisfied only if rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT. 
But when we claim that rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT, what exactly are 
we claiming? Well, if there is a nomic relation between being a hare and 
RABBIT then something sustains the link between these items – there is a 
                                                
5 If grounding is asymmetric, then, if rabbit/RABBIT grounds* every other member of Δ 
it automatically follows that none of these relations grounds* rabbit/RABBIT. But, as 
the asymmetry of grounding is a matter of controversy (see Rodriguez-Pereyra 
forthcoming), I’ll stay neutral on whether grounding is indeed asymmetric. 
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“sustaining mechanism” for the link. Laurence and Margolis, for example, 
write, “A sustaining mechanism is a mechanism in virtue of which a concept 
stands in the mind-world relation that a causal theory of content like Fodor’s 
takes to be constitutive of content” (2002, 37). When we say that rabbit/RABBIT 
grounds* hare/RABBIT, what we’re saying is that the link between being a 
rabbit and RABBIT is a sustaining mechanism for the link between being a hare 
and RABBIT. 
Second, the claim that the link between being a rabbit and RABBIT 
sustains the link between being a hare and RABBIT is compatible with the latter 
having other sustaining mechanisms. So accepting this claim doesn’t commit us 
to denying more familiar stories about what grounds the fact that there is a 
nomic relation between being a hare and RABBIT. We can consistently maintain, 
for example, that certain cognitive dispositions are sustaining mechanisms for 
the link between being a hare and RABBIT as well as the link between being a 
rabbit and this concept (Aydede and Güzeldere 2005; Bridges 2006; Fodor 
1998, Ch. 4; Laurence and Margolis 2002). 
Third, to claim that the link between being a rabbit and RABBIT sustains 
the link between being a hare and RABBIT isn’t to deny that the former also c-
determines the latter. So if the sufficient condition identified by the asymmetric 
dependence theory for being a rabbit to be the content of RABBIT is satisfied 
only if a particular counterfactual is true and you find this counterfactual 
independently plausible, claiming that the corresponding condition identified by 
the grounding theory is also satisfied doesn’t require that you reject this 
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counterfactual, at least in the absence of further argument. Consider again the 
following qualified counterfactual: ceteris paribus, were it not the case that 
there is a nomic relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT there wouldn’t be a 
nomic relation between being a hare and RABBIT either. Suppose that the link 
between being a rabbit and RABBIT sustains the link between being a hare and 
RABBIT. If the nearest possible worlds to the actual world in which there isn’t a 
nomic relation between being a rabbit and RABBIT are worlds in which there is 
no other sustaining mechanism for a link between being a hare and RABBIT, this 
counterfactual is true.6 
Fourth, grounding* is defined in terms of partial grounding. It seems 
that grounding carries modal entailment in the following sense: full grounds 
modally entail what they ground (Trogdon 2013b). If one fact merely partially 
grounds another (contingent) fact, however, we don’t get this modal 
consequence. So consider again the claim that rabbit/RABBIT grounds* 
hare/RABBIT. Were this a claim about full grounding, we would get the 
implausible consequence that any world in which there is a nomic relation 
between being a rabbit and RABBIT is a world in which there is a nomic relation 
between being a hare and RABBIT. If instead the claim concerns mere partial 
grounding – the intended reading – we don’t get this consequence.7 
                                                
6 If there are possible worlds in which there is a nomic relation between being a hare 
and RABBIT but this fact lacks grounds, such worlds are radically different from the 
actual world and thus aren’t relevant to the evaluation of this counterfactual. 
7 Example of full vs. merely partial grounding: the plurality consisting of the fact that p 
and the fact that q fully grounds the fact that p and q, while the fact that p merely 
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Fifth, just as Fodor doesn’t see his job as requiring that he provide 
arguments for the counterfactuals the asymmetric dependence theory brings in 
its train, I don’t see my job as requiring that I provide arguments for the 
grounding claims that the grounding theory brings in its train. What I want to 
do is show that, bracketing for now the project of providing detailed arguments 
for the particular counterfactual/grounding commitments of these theories (e.g. 
rabbit/RABBIT c-determines hare/RABBIT but not vice versa and rabbit/RABBIT 
grounds* hare/RABBIT), the grounding theory is a more promising nomic 
ordering theory than the asymmetric dependence theory.8 
The idea, as I’ve already indicated, turns on the problem of Quinean 
alternatives. As we’ve seen, the intensional nature of c-determination ensures 
that non-detached/RABBIT c-determines rabbit/RABBIT provided that 
rabbit/RABBIT c-determines non-detached/RABBIT. This is why c-determination 
can’t be R, the relation that induces the relevant ordering with respect to the 
                                                                                                                             
partially grounds the fact that p and q (assuming that the fact that p and the fact that 
q are different facts). Returning to the grounding theory, just what we would need to 
add to the mere partial ground described above to get a full ground is an issue I 
won’t pursue here. It would presumably have to be something about being a hare. 
8 In note 2 I describe various candidates for properties distinct from being a rabbit in 
addition to being a hare that are nomically related to RABBIT. If these properties are 
nomically related to RABBIT, then, while the sufficient condition identified by the 
asymmetric dependence theory for being a rabbit to be the content of RABBIT is 
satisfied only if certain counterfactuals concerning these properties are true, the 
corresponding condition identified by the grounding theory is satisfied only if 
certain grounding claims concerning them are true. Example: rabbit/RABBIT 
grounds* bumped/RABBIT.  
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members of Δ. What we need here is a hyperintensional relation – if R is 
hyperintensional, then, for any properties P and Q, if (i) there is a nomic 
relation between P and RABBIT, (ii) there is a nomic relation between Q and 
RABBIT, and (iii) P/RABBIT stands in R to Q/RABBIT, it doesn’t follow that (iv) 
any nomic relation that’s intensionally equivalent with P/RABBIT stands in R to 
Q/RABBIT, and (v) any nomic relation that’s intensionally equivalent with 
Q/RABBIT is such that P/RABBIT stands in R to that relation. 
Grounding* is hyperintensional, for grounding itself is hyperintensional. 
Suppose, for example, that the fact that Socrates exists grounds the fact that 
{Socrates} exists. Socrates and {Socrates} are intensionally equivalent, yet the 
fact that {Socrates} exists doesn’t ground the fact that {Socrates} exists, and 
the fact that {Socrates} exists doesn’t ground the fact that Socrates exists.9 So it 
doesn’t follow from the nature of grounding* that non-detached/RABBIT 
grounds* rabbit/RABBIT provided that rabbit/RABBIT grounds* non-
detached/RABBIT. Hence, to borrow Fodor’s phrasing, we’re free to stipulate 
that, instead of non-detached/RABBIT grounding* rabbit/RABBIT, the latter 
grounds* the former. Fodor, by contrast, isn’t free to stipulate that it’s not the 
case that non-detached/RABBIT c-determines rabbit/RABBIT, given that he’s 
committed to the claim that rabbit/RABBIT c-determines non-detached/RABBIT. 
So I conclude that, again setting to the side for now the project of providing 
                                                
9 The fact that grounding is hyperintensional (as well as non-monotonic) shows that the 
grounding locution isn’t (completely) analyzable in terms of purely modal notions 
such as supervenience or modal entailment. See Trogdon 2013a for related 
discussion.  
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detailed arguments for the particular counterfactual/grounding commitments of 
these theories – the grounding theory is a more promising nomic ordering 
theory than the asymmetric dependence theory, as it has the resources to handle 
Quinean alternatives. Nolan (2014) suggests that there are many areas in 
philosophy where we run up against limitations that can be lifted by using 
hyperintensional resources in our theorizing. I think that the problem Fodor 
faces in developing a nomic ordering theory is a case in point. 
6. Further thoughts 
While I’ve argued that the grounding theory is superior to the asymmetric 
dependence theory in so far as the former but not the latter has the resources to 
handle Quinean alternatives, I should note that I’m open to the idea that some 
other nomic ordering theory that appeals to grounding is superior to the 
grounding theory. What might such a theory look like? 10 Well, notice that there 
are other ways in which the members of Δ might be ordered whereby 
rabbit/RABBIT has a special status. Here is one example: (i) rabbit/RABBIT both 
stands in R to some other element of Δ and is such that no other element of Δ 
stands in R to it, and (ii) for any element of Δ, if it both stands in R to some 
other element of Δ and is such that no other element of Δ stands in R to it, then 
that relation is rabbit/RABBIT. Suppose that R so understood is grounding*. 
Then the idea is that, while some members of Δ distinct from rabbit/RABBIT 
                                                
10 There are hyperintensional relations other than grounding that are R-candidates, such 
as relations defined in terms of Fine’s (1994) notion of real definition. Just what a 
nomic ordering theory cast in terms of such relations would look like, however, is a 
matter I won’t pursue here.  
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might ground* other members of Δ, and some members of Δ distinct from 
rabbit/RABBIT might not be grounded* by other members of Δ, rabbit/RABBIT is 
unique in that it’s the only element of Δ that both grounds some other element 
of Δ and itself isn’t grounded by any member of Δ. On this proposal, we could 
accept, for example, that rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT and maintain that 
neither rabbit/RABBIT nor any other member of Δ grounds* bumped/RABBIT (see 
note 8), assuming that the there is no element of Δ that the latter grounds*.11 
This proposal is worth further thought, but let’s put it to the side and 
return to the original grounding theory. As we’ve seen, the sufficient condition 
identified by the theory for being a rabbit to be the content of RABBIT is 
satisfied only if certain grounding claims are true. Whether we’re justified in 
believing that these grounding claims are true is of course relevant to whether 
we should think that the condition identified by the theory is actually satisfied. 
So I think the next step to take in thinking about the grounding theory is this: 
articulate plausible diagnostics for grounding – principles that specify the 
conditions under which claims about what grounds what are plausible – and 
then see how the grounding claims the theory is committed to fair with respect 
to these diagnostics. 
                                                
11 What about the view according to which R so understood is c-determination? Well, 
in this case we don’t have to say that rabbit/RABBIT c-determines bumped/RABBIT, 
which you might think is an improvement over the asymmetric dependence theory. 
But the new theory still has a problem with Quinean alternatives – the sufficient 
condition for being a rabbit to be the content of RABBIT in this case isn’t satisfied 
because non-detached/RABBIT c-determines rabbit/RABBIT. 
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So what are plausible grounding diagnostics? This is a difficult matter – 
indeed, I think it’s one of the most difficult questions proponents of grounding 
face. The literature on grounding so far has focused on issues such as the formal 
features and logic of grounding, how the notion of grounding is related to other 
notions of philosophical interest, and what grounds the facts about what 
grounds what. These discussions, however, provide little guidance for 
formulating grounding diagnostics – it’s unclear, for example, that anything 
here could be operationalized into a discovery procedure that doesn’t crucially 
depend on our already having knowledge about what grounds what. (Similar 
considerations apply to treatments of causation.) 
Here are some preliminary remarks about grounding diagnostics – what 
I say here is quite general, but it at least gets the ball rolling. If our target is a 
particular grounding claim – this fact grounds that fact – rather than a generic 
grounding claim – these facts grounds those facts – there are at least three ways 
we might try to motivate the claim. First, we might appeal to intuitions about 
the case. Intuitively, the existence and nature of this cup (as I point to a cup), 
for example, is grounded in the existence and nature of its proper parts. Now, I 
realize that it’s controversial whether intuitions are properly thought of as 
functioning as evidence for theoretical beliefs. If you’re worried about this, read 
the claim above as conditional in nature: if intuitions serve as evidence for our 
theoretical beliefs, then one source of evidence for a particular grounding claim 
is whether we find the claim intuitively plausible. 
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Second, we might appeal to grounding principles that entail or suggest 
that the particular grounding claim is true. There is a plausible general principle 
concerning parts and wholes that tells us that the existence and nature of this 
cup is grounded in the existence and nature of its proper parts, or so you might 
argue. And a grounding principle that’s potentially relevant to the grounding 
theory is the following: if you have reason to believe that one fact grounds 
another or vice versa, then, if the properties involved in the first fact are more 
natural than the properties involved in the second fact (in Lewis’ 1983 sense), 
there is reason to believe that the former grounds the latter rather than the other 
way around. If we have reason to believe that either rabbit/RABBIT grounds* 
non-detached/RABBIT or vice versa, then this principle recommends that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* non-detached/RABBIT, assuming that being a rabbit is 
more natural than being non-detached. A natural question to ask of this 
approach, however, is what makes the grounding principles themselves 
plausible.12 
Third – or this may just be a way of answering the question just raised – 
we might consider the particular grounding claim in relation to an explanatory 
scheme in which it figures. The system of grounding claims itself is appraised 
on the basis of considerations such as simplicity, breadth, coherence, and non-
                                                
12 With regard to the grounding principle mentioned above, if naturalness itself is to be 
understood ultimately in terms of grounding then it may be that the only plausible 
diagnostic in the neighborhood here is one for naturalness claims that appeals to 
grounding. What we want, however, is a diagnostic for grounding claims that 
appeals to naturalness.  
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circularity, and the particular grounding claim inherits the plausibility (or lack 
thereof) of the explanatory scheme itself (Fine 2001). Returning to grounding 
principles, if we think of grounding principles as either explanatory schemes or 
aspects of explanatory schemes, here we have a source of evidence for 
grounding principles as well. 
Consider, for example, the claim that the existence and nature of the 
number 42 is grounded in facts concerning a certain position in an abstract 
structure. The plausibility of this grounding claim is a function of the overall 
plausibility of (a particular version of) structuralism about numbers as an 
explanatory scheme.13 Returning to the grounding theory, the claim that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT, for example, is a part of an explanatory 
scheme that, if true, (partially) solves the content placement problem. This 
explanatory scheme is superior to the explanatory scheme embodied by the 
asymmetric dependence theory, or so I’ve argued. The relevant theoretical 
virtue here is that of coherence – the latter explanatory scheme involves 
counterfactual commitments that are incompatible with the very nature of c-
determination, while the former explanatory scheme doesn’t involve grounding 
commitments that are incompatible with the nature of grounding. Supposing 
that (i) the explanatory scheme embodied by the grounding theory is superior to 
any competing explanatory scheme according to which it’s not the case that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT, and (ii) any competing explanatory 
scheme that’s on a par with the explanatory scheme embodied by the grounding 
                                                
13 See Shapiro 1997 for a defense of structuralism about mathematical theories.  
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theory agrees that rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT (candidate example: the 
theory I mentioned at the beginning of this section), we thereby have reason to 
think that this grounding claim is true, or so the idea goes.14 
The grounding claims that the grounding theory is committed to aren’t 
particularly intuitive, so it seems that, of the three potential routes to motivating 
the claims described above, the second and third are the most promising. 
Suppose that one of these grounding claims – let’s say the claim that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT – not only strikes you as not intuitive but 
outright false. Here are two things worth considering. First, your impression 
that the grounding claim is false might result from the fact that you’re focusing 
on what’s different about the causal facts – the rabbit and hare parts – rather 
than what’s the same about them – the RABBIT part. For example, if we gloss 
the question “Does rabbit/RABBIT ground* hare/RABBIT?” as “Do certain facts 
about what being a rabbit is nomically linked with ground facts about what 
being a hare is nomically linked with?” you might be inclined to say ‘no’ in 
response. But if we gloss the question instead as “Do certain facts about what 
RABBIT is nomically linked with ground other facts about what RABBIT is 
nomically linked with?” things are less clear. 
Second, there may be holistic considerations that suggest that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT, where these considerations carry more 
evidential weight than the fact that this grounding claim is counterintuitive. 
                                                
14 See also Raven 2012 and Schaffer 2009 for preliminary discussions of grounding 
diagnostics.  
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Here’s an example illustrating the point. Suppose you’re having an experience 
as of motion. The non-reductive physicalist claims that certain broadly physical 
facts – say facts concerning recurrent activity between your V1 and MT/V5 
neural structures – grounds the fact that you’re having an experience as of 
motion. This particular grounding claim strikes us as false – it strikes us that 
there is no such connection between these facts. The vast literature on the 
explanatory gap challenge to physicalism testifies to this fact. The non-
reductive physicalist, however, points out that there are powerful holistic 
considerations in support of an explanatory scheme – the system of grounding 
claims that non-reductive physicalism embodies – that has this particular 
grounding claim as a part. One such holistic consideration involves mental 
causation. Very roughly, the idea is that (i) mental events cause other mental 
and physical events; (ii) if the mental facts are grounded in certain broadly 
physical facts we can see how mental causation is possible; hence, (iii) we have 
reason to think that the mental facts are grounded in certain broadly physical 
facts (Levine 2001, Ch. 1). Cast in terms of theoretical virtues, the idea is that 
the explanatory scheme embodied by non-reductive physicalism does well with 
respect to the virtue of breadth given its implications for mental causation. So, 
returning to the grounding theory, it may be that the fact that the claim that 
rabbit/RABBIT grounds* hare/RABBIT is part of a plausible explanatory scheme 
has more evidential weight than the fact that this grounding claim strikes us as 
false. 
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7. Conclusion 
I began this chapter with the following idea: if we formulate placement 
problems in terms of grounding in the manner I sketched above, we should 
expect new possibilities to open up with respect to how to solve them. I argued 
that this is so with respect to the content placement problem in particular. The 
grounding view, while quite speculative in nature, deserves further thought. 
With recourse to grounding, perhaps naturalizing mental content along 
informational lines isn’t as hopeless as many think.15 
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